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ABSTRACT 
The human and organisational factors contributing to information security are still poorly 
understood, primarily due to a lack of research and absence of suitable techniques to assess complex 
digital systems. This paper presents the application of the System-Theoretic Accident Models and 
Process (STAMP) technique to the 2013/2014 Target Corporation data breach. The aims of the 
study are to investigate the causal factors using a systemic approach, and to demonstrate the 
benefits of the technique to information security applications. A number of critical control flaws 
were identified through the STAMP analysis include: i) poor external and internal 
communication/co-ordination of new threats and vulnerabilities; ii) inadequate learning from past 
events, internally and externally; iii) a lack of proactive security management to understand and 
learn from system successes and good practices as well as system failures; iv) ineffective 
management and co-ordination with the supply chain. 
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Introduction 
The importance of information security and the requirement to design resilient security systems is 
arguably one of the greatest technical challenges of this century. In a highly connected world, 
organisations and their workforces require flexibility and adaptability to prevent or mitigate security 
threats that are engineered to exploit human vulnerabilities and can result in catastrophic damage, 
ranging from financial and reputational losses to public safety and potentially, loss of human life. 
Mitigation against threats is best achieved using holistic assessments of sociotechnical systems and 
the human and organisational factors that, if mismanaged, result in costly incidents 
(Kraemer et. al., 2009).  
Information security traditionally focuses on technological solutions for risk mitigation (Besnard 
and Arief, 2004), however there is an increasing recognition of solutions that assess information 
security as sociotechnical systems (Kraemer and Carayon, 2003; Liginal et. al, 2009; Hauer, 2015) 
to explore the human and organisational factors behind incidents (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). 
Whilst these factors are understood in the operation of safety-critical sociotechnical systems 
(Rasmussen, 1994; Reason 1997), the literature review suggests that they are not yet thoroughly 
understood in information security (Kraemer and Carayon, 2003), which is primarily due to a lack 
of effective techniques (Hagen et. al., 2008; Lee, 2012). A number of tools are being developed or 
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adapted to the security domain to address these need, including the System-Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA) tool which has been dubbed STPA-Sec (Young, 2014; Young and Leveson, 
2014).  
It is considered that other systems-theory techniques would be equally suitable to address the lack 
of security risk management tools (Kraemer and Carayon, 2003; 2009). This paper explore the 
suitability of the ‘System-Theoretic Accident Models and Process’ (STAMP) technique. STAMP is 
a systems-theory causal analysis model that analyses where external disturbances or dysfunctional 
interactions among system components are not adequately handled by the control system 
(Leveson, 2004). STAMP views accidents as failures to adequately control system constraints on 
the design, development, operation and maintenance of the system. Using this philosophy, STAMP 
assesses how control loops degrade and migrate the safety/security margin from equilibrium 
towards a vulnerable state of elevated risk. Unlike traditional safety-based models, STAMP was 
designed to assess modern complex systems that possess high coupling, integrated computer 
technology and human-automation relationships (Leveson, 2002). These characteristics feature 
strongly in information security systems, which are highly digitalised and often rely upon a 
combination of automated systems and human operators to gather threat intelligence and respond to 
attacks, and therefore often consist of multiple human or automated controllers acting on tightly 
coupled processes. 
This study explores how STAMP can be applied to an information security breach case study to 
identify the control system interactions and flaws that led to the incident. This study will consider 
the effectiveness of applying these safety-domain techniques to address current gaps in information 
security risk assessment techniques by comparing the findings against other incident reports and 
assessments of the breach. 
Target Data Breach 
Target did not release complete details of the 2013/2014 breach, Therefore analysis has been 
collated and cross-checked using publically available information, from Jarvis and Milletary (2014), 
Radichel (2014), the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Report 
(2014), and Shu et.al. (2017). Publically available news reports (e.g. KrebsonSecurity, 
DarkReading) were also used. 
The Target security breach was the largest of its time and resulted in over 40 million customer 
credentials stolen from Point of Sale (POS) systems across 2000+ stores (Radichel, 2014), resulting 
in substantial financial and reputational losses. Figure 1 presents a timescale of the event (Jarvis & 
Milletary, 2014).  
Attack trends for similar breaches at US retail organisations in 2014 (Hawkins, 2015) demonstrate 
that extensive reconnaissance would have been performed prior to the attack. Publically available 
data on the Target security infrastructure and the supply chain would have been analysed. An 
advanced persistent threat (APT) campaign would have subsequently been conducted on Target’s 
supply chain (Chen et. al., 2014), utilising personalised ‘spear phishing’ techniques (Hong, 2012) to 
coerce security information from individuals. Supply chain organisations typically do not have the 
level of cybersecurity resources when compared to larger organisations, but can possess direct 
access to large corporate networks. On this occasion a refrigeration vendor, Fazio, was 
compromised and malicious software installed on Fazio machines to obtain passwords and 
information for Target’s vendor portal, Ariba. 
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Figure 1 – Target Data Breach Timeline (Jarvis & Milletary, 2014)  
Ariba was part of Target’s overall IT infrastructure, but was designed to be isolated from Target’s 
central ‘corporate network’. Despite this intention, attackers were able to pivot from Ariba onto the 
corporate network by uncovering preventable domain controller vulnerabilities and 
misconfigurations. Attackers were subsequently able to probe the corporate network and obtain 
administrator credentials and privileges. These activities identified areas of the network which were 
poorly configured, i.e. default user names and passwords, or where two-factor authentication (2FA) 
was missing.  
The attacker’s thorough understanding of the network was demonstrated by the creation of bespoke 
software to hijack Target’s patching service with a RAM scraping kit (Hizver and Chiueh. 2011). 
After concealing this malware within the service, it was covertly distributed to POS systems across 
Target stores and gathered credit card information from memory as cards were swiped for 
payments. Stolen information was gradually pooled into a single compromised machine on the 
corporate network and then extracted.  
Whilst the attack was sophisticated and utilised zero day vulnerabilities (Bilge and Dumitras, 2012), 
Target’s third-party Security Information and Event Management System (SIEMS) had detected 
suspicious activity within the network, and alerted Target staff to the threat. The attack was allowed 
to continue and ultimately succeed due to a failure by Target to respond to these alerts over several 
months, representing one of the most significant security failings, which was the subject of 
extensive media coverage.  
STAMP Analysis  
STAMP introduces the concept of ‘control flaws’, which constitute the ways in which control loops 
can erode, interact or fail to operate as intended such that the security constraints placed on a system 
are compromised. Hazards are defined as a “system state or set of conditions that, together with a 
particular set of worse-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident” (Leveson, 2011). 
Safety requirements and constraints  
To understand how control flaws occurred in Target’s information security systems, it is necessary 
to analyse the safety requirements and constraints of each actor. Whilst it cannot be conclusively 
determined which specific constraints each actor aimed to impose and to what extent they satisfied 
themselves that this had been achieved, a high level summary of constraints on four actors can be 
surmised and is presented in in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Security Constraints and Requirements for key Target Stakeholders 
Actors Safety requirements and constraints 
Retail Industry 
Regulator 
1) Define industry cybersecurity requirements and best practices. 
2) Ensure that the collective industry maintains resilient against cybersecurity 
threats. 
3) Oversee/enforce security auditing 
4) Outline criteria for organisations at risk. 
TARGET 
Management 
1) Interpret and oversee compliance with regulatory and legal cybersecurity 
requirements, including auditing. 
2) Ensure organisational and customer data security is adequate. 
3) Provide adequate policies, processes, management systems and resource for 
cybersecurity. 
4) Report security breaches to regulatory bodies, security authorities and 
general public. 
5) Oversee organisational training and awareness raising campaigns. 
TARGET 
Security 
Operator 
1) Ensure organisation and customer data are adequately secured using 
organisational resources, policies and processes. 
2) Configuration of network security systems. 
3) Change management and vulnerability management of network. 
4) Actively detect, monitor, escalate and respond to security threats. 
5) Enforce information access control on network. 
6) Monitor SIEMS output and network activity. 
7) Ensure that unauthorised users can not access the network. 
Supply Chain 
Organisations 
(Identical to Target Management and Target Security Operations Team) 
 
Target corporate management had overall responsibility for customer data relating to transactions at 
Target and were therefore responsible for organisational policies, processes, acquisitions and 
recruitment to ensure that information security systems adhered to federal law. Target possessed an 
internal auditing team (Schwartz, 2013) including Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliance for 
POS systems.  
Target internal security operations team implemented information security measures within the 
organisation (Radichel, 2014).  Responsibilities would have included establishing risk management 
systems, user account control, passive security software, training, patching regimes and network 
configuration. Target outsourced SIEMS management to a third party security organisation and did 
not utilise a manned SOC to monitor network activity, but would have performed active monitoring 
within their team. 
Target’s supply chain organisations were responsible for their own compliance with information 
security regulations and law. It is not thought that Target placed additional security requirements on 
their supply chain to ensure homogeneity.  
Regulatory responsibility for information security in the United States is split between various 
organisational bodies relating to specific industries. The main regulatory bodies involved in 
overseeing information security for Target are the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Together, these organisations act to provide industry 
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regulation, policy and guidance to the retail industry. Unlike regulators in the safety domain, there 
is no defined responsibility at the regulator level to ensure organisations are compliant (Levinson, 
2012); only to hold organisations accountable for “cyber-related misconduct” (Risen, 2014; 
Michaels, 2014). 
Constructing Accident Causation 
The STAMP analysis considers how hazardous control actions, mental model flaws, conflicting 
controllers and missing feedback within Target’s security system migrated the system into a state of 
elevated risk, and created the conditions by which a cyber-attack would lead to a significant loss of 
private data. The analysis will be presented from a bottom-up approach which first addresses those 
individuals/groups who were directly involved in the cyber security first and then upward through 
the system hierarchy to management and regulatory bodies. 
A hierarchical safety control structure diagram was produced (Figure 2) to depict Target’s control 
structure for protection against POS attacks, and highlights the process failures that were considered 
to contribute to the breach –red lines and text indicate control flaws/degradations, and dotted grey 
lines indicate missing control processes. Four key components of the sociotechnical systems were 
identified for detailed analysis: i) the compromised vendor (Fazio), ii) Target’s internal security 
team, iii) Target senior management and iv) the governmental/regulatory bodies overseeing 
information security for the US retail sector. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Target Corporation Process Control Diagram for Information Security 
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i) Compromised vendor (Fazio) in the Supply Chain 
Fazio were not considered to be any more or less secure than any other similarly-sized organisations 
within Target’s supply chain. The attackers exploited human engineering techniques designed to 
elicit user credentials and passwords. However, evidence suggests that Fazio did not design and 
operate their security systems in harmony with Target Corporation, and vice versa. Whilst 
compliant with US regulations, Fazio were not operating to industry best practices, for example 
relying on free antivirus software. Interactions between Target and their supply chain were limited 
to business practices, and did not extend to information security, despite the prevailing issue that 
supply chains are often the most likely path through which attackers can access the networks of 
larger organisations. This flaw meant that security constraints on the system (see Constraint 1, 
above) could not be enforced by Target, who had little to no information on how their supply chain 
operated to protect their own data, and Target’s data. In particular, human factors aspects such as 
training, awareness and internal security audits (based on a quality management system) would 
have decreased the likelihood of Fazio being compromised by social engineering techniques and 
could have been a positive approach to developing a security conscious organisational culture. 
ii) Target Security + Point of Sale (POS) 
The intended design of Target’s security system was to isolate the vendor network from Target’s 
central corporate network, and thus restrict supply chain accessibility to company information. This 
system was configured and controlled by Target’s own internal security team, who were responsible 
for monitoring, testing and updating the networks, including network traffic.  
However, security configuration flaws, such as default username and passwords and lack of 2-factor 
authentication allowed attackers to pivot from the vendor network onto the corporate network, using 
a combination of known and new exploits to leverage access onto the system. This may have 
indicated several system control flaws relating to verification of correct network configuration, 
testing of network security, and effective monitoring processes. There was little evidence to suggest 
that extensive and consistent verification and testing was conducted on security systems within 
Target due to the inconsistent network configuration, lack of 2-factor authentication and presence of 
‘default’ usernames and passwords on the network. Furthermore, Target’s monitoring systems, 
using a combination of automated SIEMS system and routine manual checking, failed to actively 
recognise and address suspicious activity on the network. Ultimately, there may not have been a 
clear (or at least comprehensive) conduct of operations for the security team, and certain key tasks 
were not procedurally led and therefore solely reliant on the competence of staff members to 
operate without adequate guidance and policy. 
Where successful detection of the attack did occur (by the automated SIEMS) over a period of 
several months, the threat was not acted upon. A missing control loop within the system meant that 
feedback provided by the SIEMS to Target staff was not escalated through organisational channels 
to the appropriate individuals/team within Target with authority to initiate a response. This 
combination of inadequate network testing and monitoring activities created a latent condition 
which violated all system security constraints; where a successful breach of the vendor network 
allowed attackers to aggressively and quickly access the corporate network unchecked and 
subsequently hijack Target’s POS patching service. This shortfall again appears to indicate 
inadequate policies within the organisation to provide a suitable chain of communication to raise 
and escalate security threats. 
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iii) Target Senior Management 
Control of sensitive data was not suitably managed by Target – who allowed sensitive security data 
to be exported outside of their virtual perimeter onto the public domain, whereby it could be 
collected as part of an intelligence gathering campaign by attackers. As organisational data can be 
handled and controlled by multiple areas of an organisation, it is judged that the control flaws 
related to data control occurred due to inadequate control and enforcement of individuals who were 
responsible for marketing data and interactions with the public domain. 
The failures of Target’s security team to control and manage the corporate network lead to an 
exploration of potential control flaws by senior management, who are the controllers of the security 
team. The control flaws identified within the security team imply that an inadequate risk and 
vulnerability management program did not exist. The RAM scraping software did not present a new 
or novel attack vector, and Target should have been aware of the importance of POS security to 
protect against these threats. Furthermore, Target’s security team had raised concerns with shortfalls 
in POS security but these were not acted upon by senior management (Radichel, 2014), 
demonstrating poor internal communication channels and conflicting allocation of responsibilities.    
Senior management did not effectively perform their control actions on the security team, in terms 
of overall strategy and quality assurance processes, which likely impacted training, quality 
assurance, supply chain management, security policies and procedures. That the security team were 
not able to act upon POS security concerns with the kind of autonomous decision making normally 
given to a specialist team indicates that conflicting controllers may have existed within the 
organisation. Ambiguity in role allocation as a leading cause of accidents is well documented by 
Leplat (1987), and would have caused conflicts and inefficiencies to exist within the system.  
iv) Regulatory Bodies 
Unlike traditional causal analysis techniques and chain of event models, STAMP allows for an 
exploration of the entire sociotechnical system, including the influence of control actions performed 
by regulatory and auditing bodies and the impact these have on how Target operated their security 
system. 
Target and Fazio were both compliant with Payment Card Industry (PCI) regulations, and 
considered that this indicated a strong information security system. This was a fundamentally 
flawed mindset, as it is not feasible for auditing to comprehensively assess all aspects of a security 
system; placing emphasis on organisations to establish a proactive security management system in 
addition to audits. Radichel places culpability of this mindset on Target senior management, and 
indeed some level of complacency may have existed within the management team that led to the 
wide range of control flaws identified throughout the organisation. 
However, the STAMP analysis allows a further interpretation to be made, that places Target’s own 
failing within a wider context and suggests that such behaviours and mindsets were widespread 
within the cyber security industry. Whilst somewhat speculative, this perspective is not without 
evidence. Through 2013-2014, a number of US retail organisations, including Target, were 
breached using almost identical attack vectors relying upon spear phishing, exploitation of widely 
known vulnerabilities and hijacking POS patching services to install RAM scraping software. The 
striking parallels between these attacks over the course of a single year suggests a failing within the 
approach to security taken by the US retail industry.  
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The security culture and mindset within a particular industry are heavily influenced by the 
governmental (e.g. regulatory) bodies that oversee it. The widespread breaches across the industry, 
and the mindset that compliance and certifications are a surrogate for security i.e. a ‘compliance 
culture’, have been inadvertently cultivated by the governmental bodies and were allowed to 
become pervasive in the industry. Understanding the extent to which regulators were culpable is a 
complicated matter. The United States does not assign responsibility for information security to a 
single organisational body, which is instead divided between federal agencies. Recommendations to 
improve industry wide communication, security culture and proactive security management 
therefore become more challenging to implement. This current arrangement of federal agencies may 
be one of the root causes as to why regulators and regulations have not been effective (a subject that 
warrants further research exploration). 
Discussion  
STAMP analysis has identified a number of critical systemic factors underlying the Target breach, 
namely inconsistent network security configuration, inadequate testing protocols, inadequate data 
control, and control flaws when transitioning from threat monitoring to escalation and response. 
The key human factors issues identified relate to staff training and awareness, security culture and 
conduct of operations – notably the lack of procedural guidance to support technical activities. 
Whilst these findings are comparable to retrospective analyse by Radichel (2014), The US Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2005) and Shu et. al. (2017), STAMP has 
extending the analysis to stakeholders external to Target and has provided a more precise analysis 
of the specific mechanisms and control flaws that comprised the root causes of the accident. 
Due to the limited information available on Target’s management and security operations team, it is 
considered that there is still much to learn about the Target breach using the STAMP technique 
should more detailed information become available. However, even when analysis the system at a 
broad level, STAMP has been an effective causal analysis tool, that unlike other investigative 
reports not only highlights the high level design flaws and errors made by Target, but also the 
fundamental system flaws that should be corrected. As a technique, STAMP does not solely explore 
system flaws and incorporates human factors considerations and interactions with the systems. In 
the context of cybersecurity, it is important that systems are resilient to an evolving threat 
landscape. Security systems should not simply be designed to address ‘known’ threats but should be 
designed and controlled to adapt to new and unprecedented attack vectors. STAMP’s ability to 
interrogate systems from a system’s theory perspective, and consideration of the human element of 
the system, lends itself well to increasing resilient performance. 
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